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PROFESSIONALISM WITHOUT
PAROCHIALISM: JULIUS HENRY COHEN,
RABBI NACHMAN OF BRESLOV, AND THE
STORIES OF TWO SONS
Samuel J. Levine*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, legal scholars and practitioners have engaged in a
voluminous debate over the characterization of legal practice as a
business or a profession.' In the face of increasing evidence
suggesting that areas of the practice of law have at least begun to
resemble business, many scholars have resisted the conclusion that
law has now become more a business than a profession.2
Some of this resistance has taken the form of a rather parochial
view of law as distinct from-and, in some sense, superior to-other
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; LL.M.,
Columbia University; J.D., Fordham University; Ordination, Yeshiva University;
B.A., Yeshiva University.
I thank Russ Pearce for inviting me to participate in "The Legal Profession:
Looking Backward." I thank Bruce Green, Andrew Kaufman, Larry Mitchell, Tom
Shaffer, Keith Sharfman, and Fraida Liba for helpful conversations and Yehudah Tzvi
and Aryeh Shalom for their encouragement.
1. See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, Faith in Legal Professionalism: Believers and
Heretics, 61 Md. L. Rev. 217, 218-20 & nn.6-14 (2002) (citing sources); Russell G.
Pearce, The Professional Paradigm Shift. Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will
Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1229 (1995);
Symposium, Conference on the Commercialization of the Legal Profession, 45 S.C. L.
Rev. 875 (1994); Symposium, Defining and Refining Professionalism: Assessing the
Roles and Regulation of Lawyers in the Twenty-First Century, 27 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1
(1999).
Notably, the issue of law as business or law as profession has taken on a global
significance. See, e.g., Okechukwu Oko, Consolidating Democracy on a Troubled
Continent. A Challenge for Lawyers in Africa, 33 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 573, 640
(2000) ("The notion of materialism celebrated by Nigerian lawyers has resulted in a
decline in professionalism and has engendered public contempt for the legal
profession .... The public will never support or appreciate a legal profession that is
more interested in making money than serving the public."); Detlev F. Vagts,
Professional Responsibility in Transborder Practice: Conflict and Resolution, 13 Geo.
J. Legal Ethics 677, 679 (2000) ("Each legal system of a developed country that I have
examined has had contradictory impulses in situating itself along the continuum
between the strictly business/economics and the strictly professional.").
2. See Levine, supra note 1, at 231-35, 238-41.
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occupations.' As one leading ethics scholar has suggested, "[t]he
lawyer's claim that the practice of law is an honorable profession is in
itself an elitist claim" because "[t]he implication is that we are in an
honorable profession, [and] others are not."4 It is further arguable
that "[t]he elitist nature of the legal profession may be most apparent
in the vehement claims that it is a profession, not a business."5
Indeed, a leading commentator on the state of the legal profession has
recently emphasized the distinction between lawyers, who are
professionals, and such "tradesmen" as "the butcher, the brewer, or
the baker."6
Although the issue continues to be raised and considered with
increasing urgency and attention, the question of law as business or
profession is not a new one; in fact, the current discussion is but the
latest manifestation of a phenomenon that has proven to represent, in
the words of one scholar, a "perennial debate."' This essay attempts
to examine the concept of law as profession through a look back at
one of the earliest works examining the question, Julius Henry
Cohen's appropriately titled 1916 book, The Law: Business or
Profession?, which anticipates many of the concerns that inform the
contemporary debate.'
3. See Thomas Ross, Knowing No Other Duty: Privity, the Myth of Elitism, and
the Transformation of the Legal Profession, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 819, 828 (1997)
("Lawyers view their occupation as distinct from most other occupations: they are
'professionals."').
4. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Honor as a Deficient Aspiration for "The Honorable
Profession": The Lawyer as Nostromo, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 859, 887 (2000). See also
Thomas L. Shaffer & Mary M. Shaffer, American Lawyers and Their Communities:
Ethics in the Legal Profession 49 (1991) (asserting that "[plrofessionalism is as elitist
as class is" and that "the hubris of its rhetoric is so arrogant as to begin to sound like
worship").
5. Cochran, supra note 4, at 887-88; cf Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under
Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal Profession Is Transforming American Society 70
(1994) ("[L]awyers' stubborn refusal to recognize their affinities with other highly
skilled, well-educated sellers of services seems to rest either on the arrogant
assumption that businesspeople have no ethics or on the dubious proposition that
businesspeople invariably place short-term profits ahead of all other
considerations.").
6. Anthony T. Kronman, Chapman University School of Law Groundbreaking
Ceremony, 1 Chap. L. Rev. 1, 3-4 (1998); see Anthony T. Kronman, Legal
Professionalism, 27 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 4-6 (1999); Anthony T. Kronman,
Professionalism, 2 J. Inst. Stud. Legal Ethics 89, 91 (1999); Anthony T. Kronman, The
Fault in Legal Ethics, 100 Dick. L. Rev. 489, 496-97 (1996). But see Steven Lubet,
Professionalism Revisited, 42 Emory L.J. 197, 198 (1993) (insisting that "the quest for
professionalism is hardly a contest between occupations").
7. Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice:
Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values
Debate, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 1115,1130 & n.66 (2000).
8. See Julius Henry Cohen, The Law: Business or Profession? (1916).
A number of law review articles cite Cohen's book as an early discussion of
the issue of law as business or law as profession, but none appears to engage the book
in a substantive or substantial manner. See, e.g., Green, supra note 7, at 1130 & nn.66-
69; Steven H. Hobbs, Ethics in the Age of Entrepreneurship, 39 S. Tex. L. Rev. 599,
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Specifically, the essay considers the lessons that may be learned
from Cohen's fictional story-a parable of sorts'°-of two sons,
whose different ethical natures and corresponding career paths
symbolize two different approaches to the practice of law. At the
same time, the essay looks back more than one hundred years further
into the past, finding significant parallels to Cohen's story in a tale by
a Chasidic master, Rabbi Nachman of Breslov, 1 who presents a
parable of two sons whose lives and career paths similarly signify
fundamental differences in character and personal integrity. 2 The
603 (1998); Erik M. Jensen, Book Review, 1990 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 133, 160;
Herbert M. Kritzer, The Professions Are Dead, Long Live the Professions: Legal
Practice in a Postprofessional World, 33 Law & Soc'y Rev. 713, 722 n.17 (1999);
Kenneth Lasson, Lawyering Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Fees and Justice, 74
B.U. L. Rev. 723, 730 n.34 (1994); Milton C. Regan, Law Firms, Competition
Penalties, and the Values of Professionalism, 13 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1, 3 & n.9 (1999);
S.S. Samuelson & L. Fahey, Strategic Planning for Law Firms: The Application of
Management Theory, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 435, 437 n.18 (1991); Ted Schneyer,
Policymaking and the Perils of Professionalism: The ABA's Ancillary Business Debate
as a Case Study, 35 Ariz. L. Rev. 363, 369 n.44 (1993); Vagts, supra note 1, at 679 n.7.
9. See Cohen, supra note 8, at 173-76.
10. Professor Green refers to the story as a "parable," Green, supra note 7, at
1130, apparently because of the underlying message it conveys. Rabbi Nachman's
stories are more classically categorized as parables, with intended alternate levels of
meaning beyond those evident from a plain reading of the stories. See Adin Steinsaltz,
The Tales of Rabbi Nachman of Bratslav, at viii (1993) ("On the one hand, any child
can read [the stories] as one would a tale of ancient days, as the author himself put it;
and, on the other hand, one can as an adult read them again and again, analyze and
study them, and constantly discover in them layer upon layer of hitherto unrevealed
symbol and meaning.").
11. See Nachman of Breslov, Sippurey Ma'asioth [Rabbi Nachman's Stories] 160-
96 (Aryeh Kaplan trans., 1983) [hereinafter Rabbi Nachman's Stories].
It should be noted that "[tIhere seems to be considerable confusion among
English writers about how to spell Rabbi Nachman's city." Aryeh Kaplan, Gems of
Rabbi Nachman 181 (1980). For example, "Bratzlav, the spelling adapted by most
contemporary writers, is based on a transliteration of the modern Russian," while
"Io]ther variant spellings are Brazlaw, Braclav, Bratslav, and Braslavl." Id. (citations
omitted). Nevertheless, "the spelling Breslov is preferred by all English speaking
readers of Rabbi Nachman" and "[t]here is considerable evidence from oral tradition
that this was the way the name was pronounced in the time of Rabbi Nachman." Id.
Similarly, the name "Nachman" is an English transliteration that also appears as
"Nahman." See, e.g., Steinsaltz, supra note 10 (using the spellings "Nachman of
Bratslav"); Elie Wiesel, Souls on Fire: Portraits and Legends of Hasidic Masters 169
(Marion Wiesel trans., 1973) (using the variant spellings "Nahman of Bratzlav").
12. This essay, which focuses on stories by Julius Cohen and Rabbi Nachman,
aims, in part, to contribute to the body of ethics scholarship relating to narrative and
storytelling. As one scholar recently observed, a list of "[t]he works of legal
scholarship focused on or exemplifying storytelling no longer fit in a symposium, let
alone in a footnote." Barbara Stark, After/word(s): "Violations Of Human Dignity"
and Postmodern International Law, 27 Yale J. Int'l L. 315, 321 n.40 (2002). For one
collection of such works, applied to a broad range of legal issues, see Samuel J.
Levine, Halacha and Aggada: Translating Robert Cover's Nomos and Narrative, 1998
Utah L. Rev. 465, 467-68 n.8. For a discussion of narrative in the work of several
leading ethics scholars, see Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously: Broad
Ethics Provisions and Unenumerated Ethical Obligations in a Comparative
Hermeneutic Framework, 77 Tulane L. Rev. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at n.112,
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essay relies on these two stories to offer a more inclusive model of
legal practice, one that views law as a potentially noble profession, but
a profession whose virtues may find nearly universal expression in
other occupations as well.
I. RABBI NACHMAN OF BRESLOV'S STORY OF Two SONS
It may be helpful to introduce Cohen's story of two sons by first
looking at a narrative analog that not only predated Cohen's story by
more than one hundred years but that first appeared in a cultural
milieu far different from that of the lawyers whose work Cohen
examined. 3 Among the most famous and influential of the European
Chasidic masters, Rabbi Nachman of Breslov was perhaps most
renowned for the parables he told.14 According to one contemporary
translator, these stories, "among the great classics of Jewish
literature[,] ... have been recognized.., for their depth and insight
into both the human condition and the realm of the mysterious."' 5
Since they were first published, the stories have provided fertile
ground for exploration and explication by both devotees of Rabbi
Nachman and other scholars, some of whom have uncovered allusions
to the Bible, Talmud, Midrash and Kabbalah," others who have
focused on the literary style of the tales, finding them "[m]ore daring
than the most daring of the surrealists,"'7 with parallels to the work of
Franz Kafka.' At the same time, however, as Rabbi Nachman's chief
on file with author).
13. As Professor Gerald Torres has observed, "[t]he context within which the
story is told and the context within which the story is heard are critical in determining
the meaning of the story .... Thus, because every narrative is rooted in a particular
time and circumstance, retelling the 'same' story in a different context changes its
meaning." Gerald Torres, Translation and Stories, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1366
(2002).
In a sense, the comparison of Rabbi Nachman's story of two sons to that of
Julius Cohen operates inversely to the principle set forth by Torres, suggesting that
two "different" stories may share a similar meaning when understood in the context
of the time and circumstance in which each is rooted.
14. For English discussions of the life and teachings of Rabbi Nachman, see, e.g.,
Aryeh Kaplan, The Chasidic Masters and Their Teachings 103-21 (2d ed. 1989)
[hereinafter Kaplan, Chasidic Masters]; Kaplan, Gems of Rabbi Nachman, supra note
11, passim; Rabbi Nachman's Stories, supra note 11, passim; Steinsaltz, supra note 10,
passim; Wiesel, supra note 11, at 169-202.
15. See Aryeh Kaplan, Translator's Introduction to Rabbi Nachman's Stories,
supra note 11, at x.
16. Id. See Aryeh Kaplan, Translator's Notes on Rabbi Nachman's Stories, supra
note 11, passim [hereinafter Kaplan, Translator's Notes]; see also Steinsaltz, supra
note 10, at xix (stating that "sources from which the [stories'] details of plot and tale
are drawn are many and varied," including "Kabbalah, folk tales, Bible and Halachah,
history and contemporary events").
17. Wiesel,supra note 11, at 180.
18. Id. at 172; see Steinsaltz, supra note 10, at xvi (stating that Kafka's work "has
much in common with" Rabbi Nachman's); see also Kaplan, Chasidic Masters, supra
note 14, at 106 (observing that in Rabbi Nachman's tales, "we encounter kings and
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disciple and collector of the stories relates, the tales were intended for
the masses, embarked upon after Rabbi Nachman concluded that "my
lessons and conversations are not having any effect in bringing you
back to God,"' 9 and told in the Yiddish vernacular so that they could
be understood by all.2"
Typical of Rabbi Nachman's stories, "The Sophisticate and the
Simpleton"'" contains many of the characteristic elements that
fascinate scholars, but also sends a more evident message, one
relevant beyond the realm of the Chasidic adherents to whom the tale
was addressed. The story tells of two wealthy individuals who live in
the same city and send their respective sons to the same school.2
These sons, however, are of substantially differing character,
accounting for the story's title. "One of these sons had deep
understanding and was quite sophisticated. The other one was simple;
he was not lacking in intelligence, but had a straightforward, humble
approach, without any sophistication. "23 Elaborating on this
description, Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan notes that "wisdom is usually
generals rubbing shoulders with mystics and beggars in a fairyland of Kabbalistic
symbolism," and noting that "[m]any books and learned articles have been written in
an attempt to unravel this symbolism, using everything from Jungian psychology to
the Kabbalah itself"). One contemporary scholar has compared Rabbi Nachman's
work to a Breughel painting, "where even the seemingly trivial or scarcely seen detail
is portrayed as exactly as the central figures themselves," and to the work of Chagall,
consisting of "pictures of figures of speech." Steinsaltz, supra note 10, at xx-xxi, xxii.
19. See Rabbi Nathan Sternhartz of Nemerov, Introduction to Rabbi Nachman's
Stories, supra note 11, at 9; see also Steinsaltz, supra note 10, at xvii (quoting Rabbi
Nachman as declaring "[f]rom now on I will tell you tales" and "adding that he
believed that thus he would be better able to explain his teachings in a more profound
and penetrating way").
Some contemporary American legal scholars have similarly explained the use
of "narrative form" in place of the "legal voice." As one article has observed, "First,
the narrative form of discourse permits the author to express a range of emotions."
Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, The Tales of White Folk: Doctrine, Narrative,
and the Reconstruction of Racial Reality, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 377, 435 (1996). Specifically,
[t]here are some things that just cannot be said by using the legal voice ....
Rage, pain, elation, the aching, thirsting, hungering for freedom on one's
own terms, love and its joys and terrors, fear, utter frustration at being
contained and constrained by legal language; all are diffused by legal
language.
Id. at 436 (quoting Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The
Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 886,
903 (1989)). "Second, narrative form is not confined or limited to formal legalistic
arguments." Id.
Though more expansive than the concise statement attributed to Rabbi
Nachman, these rationales appear consistent with Rabbi Nachman's explanation for
his turn to storytelling.
20. See Rabbi Nathan Sternhartz of Nemerov, Second Introduction to Rabbi
Nachman's Stories, supra note 11, at 28; Wiesel, supra note 11, at 179.
21. See Rabbi Nachman's Stories, supra note 11, at 160-96.
22. See id. at 160.
23. Id. at 161.
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considered a positive trait."24 Yet, in the context of the story, the
connotation of the original term25- translated  here as
"sophisticated" 
-refers to wisdom that is not "accompanied by
humility and piety," but instead is in the nature of "arrogan[ce] and
skeptic[ism] ... often le[ading the Sophisticate] to conclusions that
[are] totally wrong." 6  Conversely, Rabbi Kaplan continues, the
"simple"27 son is more fully understood as "without guile, and
shunn[ing] casuistry and roundabout reasoning." 2
The difference in nature of the two sons finds expression in their
choice of occupation. The Simpleton learns the trade of a
shoemaker,29 evoking Kronman's reference to the butcher, the brewer
and the baker." In fact, it appears that Rabbi Nachman's choice of a
shoemaker was specifically intended to epitomize a lack of public
esteem. As Rabbi Kaplan suggests, of all the trades, "[a] shoemaker is
usually seen as the lowliest of occupations."'" The Sophisticate,
24. Kaplan, Translator's Notes, supra note 16, at 161.
25. In Yiddish, the term "chakham" is used. See id.
26. Id. Thus, the term "sophisticated" is used in the sense of "deceptive" or
"misleading." See Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 1820 (2d ed.
1997) (definition 3) [hereinafter Dictionary].
Similarly, as Maimonides and others have explained, God's command not to
eat from the "tree of knowledge" in the Garden of Eden, see Genesis 2:17, was not to
prevent humans from obtaining knowledge per se, but to prevent the use of
"knowledge" in an improper and intellectually dishonest manner. See Maimonides,
The Guide of the Perplexed 1:2. See generally Samuel J. Levine, The End of
Innocence, Hamevaser, Dec. 1989, at 8.
Rabbi Kaplan notes a further similarity to the Garden of Eden in the Torah's
depiction of the deceptive serpent as "clever" or "subtle," similar to Rabbi
Nachman's characterization of the Sophisticate. Kaplan, Translator's Notes, supra
note 16, at 161 (citing Genesis 3:1). Indeed, another contemporary translation of the
story refers to the "Clever Man and the Simple Man," Steinsaltz, supra note 10, at
165, and describes the simple man as having a "plain mind, not subtle." Id. at 167.
27. As Rabbi Kaplan further notes, the term "tam," used in the original, is also the
biblical term whose root is used to describe individuals of "simple"-or pure or
complete-virtue, such as Noah, Abraham, and Jacob. See Kaplan, Translator's Notes,
supra note 16, at 162 (quoting Genesis 6:9; 17:1; 25:27).
28. Id. at 162. The Simpleton thus stands in contrast to the Sophisticate, whose
name derives its negative connotation from the term "sophism." See Dictionary,
supra note 26, at 1820 (offering definition 5 of "sophistication" as "the use of
sophistry; a sophism, quibble, or fallacious argument," and definition 1 of "sophistry"
as "a subtle, tricky, superficially plausible, but generally fallacious method of
reasoning").
29. See Rabbi Nachman's Stories, supra note 11, at 163.
30. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
31. Kaplan, Translator's Notes, supra note 16, at 163. Rabbi Kaplan attributes this
attitude to the fact that shoes are often unclean, a condition that, he observes, carries
with it ritual ramifications as well. Id.
The picture of a simple or honest shoemaker as a model of virtue has older
roots in Jewish thought. In Genesis, the Torah states that "Enoch walked with God."
Genesis 5:22. A midrashic exegesis of this verse describes Enoch as a shoemaker, who
worshipped God with each stitch. See I Eliyahu Dessler, Michtav M'Eliyahu 34
(Aryeh Carmell & Alter Halpern eds., 1954); see also Steinsaltz, supra note 10, at 203
(noting the similarity to Enoch).
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however, repeatedly deems himself worthy of a more prestigious line
of work, which he sets off to pursue in a number of other cities.32
Starting as a merchant's apprentice, he achieves a number of different
positions until he ultimately studies medicine and becomes a
physician.33
Nevertheless, just as the name of each of the sons, in a sense, belies
the value of each one's character-the Simpleton being of higher
ethical character than the Sophisticate 34-the success each has
attained belies the level of happiness and sense of personal fulfillment
each possesses. With each additional success, the Sophisticate finds
himself more dissatisfied with his position .3  Because of his constant
concern for status and personal glory, he worries that if he remains
away from his home, "who will know what I have accomplished?"36
Therefore, he determines that he must return home for all to see what
he has achieved. Even upon his return, however, his work is not
appreciated by those he serves.37 In addition, while the Sophisticate
travels abroad in pursuit of his ambitious goals, there is no one to care
for the possessions he leaves behind, and thus the mansion-
metaphorically, the set of values-he inherits from his father is
"neglected and in ruins, so that nothing remain[s] of it."38
Meanwhile, the Simpleton, despite his relative lack of financial
success and status, is content with his life.39 Moreover, in sharp
contrast to the Sophisticate, when confronted with the opinions of
those who compare his product and profit to those of others, he
responds: "What do I care about that? That is their work, and this is
my work! Why must we speak of others?"4"' Finally, because he
Analyzing this explication of the verse, some later commentators were
troubled by the possible implication that Enoch engaged in some form of prayer while
working, potentially distracting him and detracting from his work, and thereby
violating the duty to place all of his efforts in the job for which he was hired and paid.
Therefore, some interpret the midrashic reference to worshipping God on more of a
metaphorical level, suggesting that Enoch worshipped God through careful, faithful,
and meticulously ethical performance of his job. Dessler, supra, at 34-35. That such
conduct, according to this understanding, is singled out in the Genesis text as a form
of "walking with God" powerfully mirrors the lesson of Rabbi Nachman's tale,
emphasizing the importance of personal virtue instead of societal status.
32. See Rabbi Nachman's Stories, supra note 11, at 163-64; see also Steinsaltz,
supra note 10, at 200 (noting that the Sophisticate is "attracted to the most superficial
characteristics of status").
33. See Rabbi Nachman's Stories, supra note 11, at 164-67.
34. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
35. See Rabbi Nachman's Stories, supra note 11, at 164-67.
36. Id. at 167.
37. Id. at 176.
38. Id. at 174.
39. See id. at 168. Rabbi Kaplan notes the allusion to the Talmudic dictum, "Who
is [truly] wealthy? One who is satisfied with one's lot." Talmud, Avoth 4:1, cited in
Kaplan, Translator's Notes, supra note 16, at 168.
40. Rabbi Nachman's Stories, supra note 11, at 171-72.
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remains at home, the Simpleton inherits and lives in his father's
mansion.4
Though the story continues,42 with the metaphors and their
meanings becoming more complex and mysterious, 3 for the purposes
of the current study, the clear lessons about the ultimate and
overriding value of personal ethics and integrity provide a fitting
introduction to a discussion of Julius Cohen's story of two sons, which
would appear more than one hundred years later in New York City.
II. JULIUS COHEN'S STORY OF Two SONS
Cohen dedicates the second section of his book, titled
"Profession?," to a discussion of aspects of the practice of law that he
deems more befitting a business venture than the profession of law.44
Cohen opens the section with the story of two sons.45
Immediately evoking Rabbi Nachman's parable, Cohen's story also
presents a shoemaker as a central character in the narrative, in the
figure of a father of one of the sons.46 In fact, Cohen puts the reader
in the place of the hypothetical shoemaker, setting forth the parallel
legal careers of "your son" and the "son of Thompson."47 "Your" son,
at the age of twenty-five or twenty-six, opens a law office,
"maintaining always the standards of the profession which you
yourself honor sufficiently to desire him enrolled in its ranks."48
Owing to hard work and "[h]is personal character," he develops "the
small commercial litigation with which all lawyers of the preceding
generation began their practice. '49 "Gradually," approaching the age
of thirty and "thoroughly trustworthy in all his dealings," he gains the
respect of courts and clients.5 Finally, at the age of thirty-five or
thirty-six, he has "the best commercial practice in your part of the
country."'"
41. Id. at 174.
42. The brief summary offered here digests less than half of the complete story,
which follows the sons' individual journeys. Ultimately, the Simpleton becomes ruler
of the land while the Sophisticate's condition repeatedly and increasingly deteriorates
until, with the help of the Simpleton, he is finally redeemed from his suffering. See id.
at 175-96.
43. Scholars have offered varied interpretations of the story and its messages. See,
e.g., Kaplan, Translator's Notes, supra note 16, at 160-96; see also Steinsaltz, supra
note 10, at 206-15.
44. Cohen, supra note 8, at 173.
45. Id. at 174.
46. Id. at 173.
47. Id. at 174.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
[Vol. 711346
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Thompson's son, in contrast, who lives in the same city, is "of more
or less shady reputation. "52 He is admitted to practice despite being of
"little ability and with less character," though he is "crafty. 5 3 He
"soon becomes known in your part of the country for what he really
is, until he scarce can find a client in the county who will confide in
him."54 At this point in the story, the parallels to the ethical nature of
Rabbi Nachman's Simpleton and Sophisticate begin to evince
themselves.
The two sons are presented with offers to have their cards placed in
a "directory" and to represent the trade and collection agencies and
the trade associations of the large cities in the county. Your son,
"because he has been properly bred and trained, turns down the
offer."55  Thompson's son, however, accepts the offer, thereby
becoming the leading bankruptcy lawyer in the town, while your son
"has the character and respect of your community but not much
else."56 Still, "in spite of the unfair competition, your son continues to
maintain his practice," loyal, like the Simpleton, to his own values and
those he has inherited from his father. 7 Thus, both the character and
the financial positions of the sons continue to echo those of the
Sophisticate and the Simpleton.
As the story concludes, like the Sophisticate, whose conduct-in
spite of his success as a physician-is held in disrepute by the
members of the city, Thompson's son "brings a new reputation to
your community," which has become "a place where men are readily
petitioned into bankruptcy, where there are 'quick settlements.' 58
Most disturbingly, "your friends in the shoe line begin to think of the
whole profession (which includes your son, do not forget)... : 'The
law is a sort of hocus-pocus science, that smiles in yer face while it
picks yer pocket ....
Beyond the similarities to Rabbi Nachman's parable, Cohen's story
is fascinating on a number of levels, not in the least for its relevance to
recent and current controversies in legal ethics relating to advertising
by lawyers" and multidisciplinary practice.61 For the purposes of this
52. Id. at 174-75.
53. Id. at 175.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Symposium on Lawyer Advertising, 49 Ark. L. Rev. 671 (1997); Allen
Chair Symposium 2001, 36 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1 (2002).
61. See, e.g., Symposium, The Brave New World of Multidisciplinary Practice, 50 J.
Legal Educ. 469 (2000); Business Law Symposium, Multidisciplinary Practice, 36
Wake Forest L. Rev. 1 (2001); Future of the Profession: A Symposium on
Multidisciplinary Practice, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 1083 (2000); Symposium,
Multidisciplinary Practice, 20 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 153 (2000);
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essay, however, it may be most notable that, in calling for lawyers to
adopt professional conduct and to eschew business conduct, Cohen
neither exalts the practice of law as inherently virtuous nor disparages
business or other occupations as less capable of providing a means for
virtuous conduct.
Significantly, Cohen refuses to measure the level of professionalism
in legal practice by the level of financial success or personal acclaim.
Indeed, in Cohen's story, the "leading bankruptcy lawyer," who
holds-by contemporary standards, at least-one of the most
prestigious positions in the legal establishment,62 epitomizes, in his
conduct, the failure of some attorneys to maintain personal integrity
or professional ideals.63 Instead, it is the lawyer of personal character,
who has gained the respect of the community "but not much else,"
who likewise wins Cohen's admiration for exemplifying conduct
worthy of the legal profession.'
Moreover, consistent with his view of personal virtue as more
important and more meaningful than professional status, Cohen does
not restrict his call for, or appreciation of, increased ethical
performance to the work of lawyers, or even to occupations that may
be included in the category of the "professions." In the introduction
to his book, Cohen acknowledges the inspiration and leadership of
two individuals, Dr. Felix Adler and Mr. Charles Boston." The
relevance of Boston's work to Cohen's project is not surprising; after
all, Boston was an attorney who, at the time of the appearance of the
book, was Chairman of the Standing Committee on Professional
Ethics for the New York County Lawyers' Association.6
Cohen's reliance on Adler, however, may be more telling. As the
founder of the Society for Ethical Culture, Adler, in Cohen's words,
"devoted himself to stimulating ethical thought in every active field of
endeavor."67 Describing what he sees as Adler's chief contribution to
the field of ethics, Cohen cites Adler's assertion that because "duty is
a matter of daily vocational service, preachment without active
Multidisciplinary Practice Symposium, 32 Loyola U. Chi. L.J. 543 (2001); Symposium,
Professional Responsibility and Multi-Disciplinary Practice, 52 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
861 (2002); Symposium, 20 Pace L. Rev. 43 (1999); ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of Delegates, Symposium on
Multidisciplinary Practice (2001). Indeed, these two subjects are central areas of
focus in Part II of Cohen's book, titled "Profession?"
62. Though this observation is admittedly anachronistic and may not reflect the
attitude of the legal establishment in Cohen's times, in the context of the story, the
bankruptcy lawyer appears to have attained a significant level of professional status as
a result of his financial success.
63. Cohen, supra note 8, at 175.
64. Id.
65. See id. at xviii.
66. See id. at xvi.
67. Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
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application is of no avail."6 Cohen emphasizes Adler's conclusion
that "[t]herefore, each vocation-business, industry, the professions-
must solve its own ethical problems. '"69 As a result of this broad range
of concern, Adler "turned to the lawyers as well as the business men,
and spurred them to the formation of groups for the study of applied
ethics."'
Echoing Adler, Cohen likewise finds common ethical imperatives
and potential among different vocations, describing "the idea of
service" as one that is "true to-day of other businesses as it is of
railroads and retailers" and one that also "runs through the whole of
the ethics of the legal profession."71 In fact, Cohen largely bridges the
ethical distinctions among different occupations, observing that "[t]he
ethics of trade are approximating the ethics of the profession."72
Cohen's focus on personal ethics rather than on professional status
is perhaps best exemplified in his choice of and attitude toward the
shoemaker. In the story of two sons, the shoemaker has instilled in his
son the overriding values of personal and professional integrity,
protecting his son from the powerful temptations that succeed in
capturing Thompson's son, who is not of the same ethical caliber.
Addressing the reader as shoemaker, Cohen neither condescends nor
insults, but instead treats a member of the "trade" as an ethical equal
to those of the legal profession. Indeed, the shoemaker is ethically
superior to Thompson's son-the financially successful lawyer-and it
is the shoemaker's ethical fortitude to which Cohen appeals in setting
forth his aspirations for the ethical conduct of lawyers. Thus, the
chapter that opens with the story of two sons closes with a final
message to the shoemaker, including a reminder that, as in law, in the
decidedly business-like activity of selling shoes, "service is set above
profit."'73
III. PROFESSIONALISM WITHOUT PAROCHIALISM
Contrary to elitist claims of legal professionalism, Rabbi Nachman
and Julius Cohen use the stories of two sons to teach that the true
measure of an individual's value to society is more a function of
personal character than of professional status.74 In both stories, the
ambitious but unscrupulous son initially finds financial success yet
ultimately fails to gain the respect earned by the other son, who
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 158-59 (emphasis omitted).
71. Id. at 42.
72. Id. at 43.
73. Id. at 198.
74. Cf. Cochran, supra note 4, passim; Shaffer & Shaffer, supra note 4, at 49
(finding that professionalism's "esteem for professional fraternity is an ethic of honor
rather than of virtue").
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forgoes personal glory in deference to the more important goal of
maintaining ethical integrity.75
Recognizing this lesson may prove helpful for lawyers in
formulating a more meaningful notion of professionalism, one based
in ethical commitments rather than in unfounded and unnecessary
assumptions and judgments about the relative importance of different
occupations. Perhaps ironically, such professionalism may be
grounded in the acknowledgment of common ethical principles that
the practice of law shares with other endeavors, including business.
Though such an approach may require proponents of
professionalism to accept a new model of legal practice - a new
"paradigm" as Russell Pearce calls it76-this view of law is not a novel
one. Mary Ann Glendon has poignantly cited Abraham Lincoln for
the proposition that "law is a business" and "virtue in a lawyer [is] not
much different from common decency in any other calling. '77 On a
similar note, the chapter in which Cohen cites Adler's views is titled
"Applying Ethics to Daily Life in One Profession. '78  This is
consistent with the approach espoused by Adler and adopted by
Cohen, placing the practice of law as one among many occupations
which allow for and call for ethical and virtuous behavior.79 More
recently, Pearce has credited Thomas Shaffer with "find[ing] an ethic
of service consistent with all occupations and derid[ing] the
75. Professor Lisa Lerman's recent study "explor[ing] the relationships among
ambition, greed, and integrity in the legal profession" further highlights the relevance
of these stories and their lessons to the ethical dilemmas facing today's lawyers. Lisa
G. Lerman, The Slippery Slope from Ambition to Greed to Dishonesty: Lawyers,
Money, and Professional Integrity, 30 Hofstra L. Rev. 879, 880 (2002). Lerman finds
that "[mjany lawyers are preoccupied with gaining power within their law firms and
with expanding their own incomes," while "[flor some lawyers, income is the clearest
measure of their status." Id. In either event, "[pireoccupation with money tends to
have a corrosive effect on integrity." Id. Professor Deborah Rhode has observed,
"Addictive ambition" fuels desires not readily satisfied. Attorneys who look
hard enough can always find someone getting something more. And the
purchases that signal status today may look inadequate tomorrow. Well-
paid professionals can always find another category in which to compete:
trips, cars, fashion, charity, even children's parties. The market is
inexhaustively obliging.
Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession 33
(2000); id. at 23-38 (describing the "dynamics of discontent" in legal practice as rooted
in "the priority of profit").
76. See Pearce, supra note 1, passim. Notably, however, according to at least one
leading ethics scholar, this shift may be more in the nature of nomenclature than
substance. See Bruce A. Green, Public Declarations of Professionalism, 52 S.C. L.
Rev. 729, 737 n.18 (2001) ("It may fairly be argued that most, if not all, of the values
conventionally associated with professionalism are simply common values given
specific application in the context of legal practice.").
77. Glendon, supra note 5, at 70 (quoting Abraham Lincoln, Notes for a Law
Lecture, in Selected Speeches, Messages, and Letters 33 (T. Harry Williams ed.,
1957)).
78. Cohen, supra note 8, at 157-71.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 65-73.
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Professionalism Paradigm's characterization of lawyers as somehow
superior to others in money-making occupations."8
At the same time, renouncing claims to the legal profession's
intrinsic superiority includes rejecting the assumption that law is
inherently ethical and virtuous and that, therefore, those who practice
law are deserving of respect and esteem regardless of the ethical
quality of their conduct. Instead, lawyers will begin to appreciate the
broad range of human endeavors and occupations, each of which
carries with it both ethical challenges and the potential opportunity of
contributing to a virtuous life. Accepting their position as one among
many occupations, lawyers will thus acknowledge, both as a group and
on an individual level, that respect must be earned through virtuous
conduct, rather than expected by virtue of their choice of work.81 In
short, again in Pearce's words, lawyers will have "no choice but to
accept that they [are] accountable for their actions[,] just like
everyone else.
8 2
Once lawyers realize more fully that the virtue of their work is
dependent on the ethics of their conduct, attempts to improve
professionalism and the ethical practice of law will likely involve a
more honest and searching effort to' incorporate values beyond those
leading to the successful and profitable outcome of a case. A less
parochial conceptualization of legal professionalism might involve
80. Pearce, supra note 1, at 1266 (citing Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyer
Professionalism as a Moral Argument, 26 Gonz. L. Rev. 393, 403-04 (1990-91)); see
also Russell G. Pearce, Law Day 2050. Post-Professionalism, Moral Leadership, and
the Law-as-Business Paradigm, 27 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 9, 23 (1999) (describing "the
understanding that all people, whether in the elite or not, share responsibility for the
public good in whatever work they do."). As Pearce emphasizes, "this obligation
appl[ies] equally to business and to law practice." Pearce, supra note 1, at 1260.
81. Cf Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory,
Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 223, 268
(1993) ("By creating an aura of 'professionalism'-the notion that lawyers are, by
intellect, training, and special characteristics, unique-the [ethics] codes enable
lawyers to command respect and financial reward exceeding that of blue collar
workers and other professionals who perform similar services.").
82. Pearce, supra note 80, at 21; cf Shaffer & Shaffer, supra note 4, at 71
(criticizing professionalism's "claim of immunity" that "[p]rofessionals operate
outside the boundaries of ordinary morality"); Thomas L. Shaffer, Faith and the
Professions 71-72 (1987) (asking "[i]s there a separate morality for professional life?"
and answering "[i]n terms of experience, convention, and argot, the answer to that
question would appear to be: Yes... [o]ur forebears have not followed, and we do not
follow, the same morals in public and professional life that we follow in personal
life").
These changes in perspective may lead lawyers to ask the uncomfortable
question: "How dysfunctional are we lawyers if we have to be continually reminded,
over the course of decades, to behave in our professional lives in the way people are
ordinarily expected to behave in their lives and work?" Green, supra note 76, at 737
n.18.
As troubling as the question may be, and as difficult as it may be to answer, it
would seem more troubling to permit the question to remain unasked and thereby to
preclude even the possibility of addressing it and attempting to answer it.
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looking to the actions of members of other occupations, in addition to
actions outside of the workplace, for examples of ethical values and
conduct that may be incorporated into the practice of law as well.
The adoption of a legal professionalism that looks outside the legal
context for ethical guidelines to be incorporated into the practice of
law may lead lawyers increasingly to turn to religion and other value
systems in an effort to identify and articulate such ethical principles.
Moreover, incorporation of a lawyer's religious or other personal
values may not only improve the state of legal professionalism, but
also may provide a means through which lawyers may attempt to
bridge their seemingly separate personal and professional lives.8 3
Indeed, the importance of living a consistently ethical life, both "at
home" and "in town" in Shaffer's words, 4 is central to the work of
both Rabbi Nachman and Julius Cohen.
Of course, it is not surprising that the work of Rabbi Nachman, a
Chasidic master, highlights the imperative of engaging in ethical
conduct in all areas of life. Starting with the text of the Torah and
continuing through the teachings of contemporary scholars, Jewish
tradition has emphasized the all-encompassing nature of religious and
ethical duties and obligations.8 5
Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik has eloquently expressed the unity of the
ethical lifestyle, writing that "[t]he marketplace, the street, the factory,
the house, the meeting place, the banquet hall, all constitute the
backdrop for the religious life."8 6 Thus, he explains, in Jewish thought
an individual "stands before God not only in the synagogue but also in
83. See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, Responding to the Problems of Ethical
Schizophrenia, 38 Cath. Law. 145 (1998); Martha Minow, On Being a Religious
Professional. The Religious Turn In Professional Ethics, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 661 (2001);
Symposium, Faith and the Law, 27 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 911 (1996); Symposium,
Lawyering and Personal Values, 38 Cath. Law. 145 (1998); Symposium, Rediscovering
the Role of Religion in the Lives of Lawyers and Those They Represent, 26 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 821 (1999); Symposium, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: An
Interfaith Conference, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 1075 (1998).
84. See Thomas L. Shaffer, On Living One Way in Town and Another Way at
Home, 31 Val. U. L. Rev. 879 (1997). Shaffer's use of the concepts "town" and
"home" are drawn from the statement of Harper Lee's Atticus Finch, who declares
that "I can't live one way in town and another way in my home." Id. at 879 (quoting
Harper Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird 267 (Fawcett Popular Library 1962) (1960)).
85. See Aryeh Kaplan, The Handbook of Jewish Thought 78 (1979) (stating that
the commandments "penetrate every nook and cranny of a person's existence,
hallowing even the lowliest acts and elevating them to a service to God" and that "the
multitude of laws governing even such mundane acts as eating, drinking, dressing and
business, sanctify every facet of life, and constantly remind one of [one's]
responsibilit[y] toward God"); see also Moshe Silberg, Law and Morals in Jewish
Jurisprudence, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 306, 322 (1961) ("The Jew's mode of dress, his diet,
dwelling, behavior, relation with men, his family affairs, and his business affairs were
all prefixed and premolded, in a national cloak, in a set of laws that was clear, severe,
strict, detailed, that accompanied him day by day, from cradle to grave.").
86. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Halakhic Man 94 (Lawrence Kaplan trans., 1983)
(originally published in Hebrew as Ish ha-halakhah, in I Talpiot 3-4 (1944)).
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the public domain, in [the] house, while on a journey, while lying
down and rising up."87 Indeed, it is striking that in tales such as that of
the two sons, Rabbi Nachman does not, on a literal level, invoke
religious ritual or even refer expressly to Judaism or to God.88
Instead, through the depiction of apparently temporal pursuits such as
that of the "simple" shoemaker,89 his tales powerfully illustrate a more
profound lesson: as Rabbi Soloveitchik dramatically puts it, the
synagogue and the study house are merely "minor sanctuaries," while
"[t]he true sanctuary is the sphere of our daily, mundane activities, for
it is there that the realization of [religious and ethical obligation] takes
place. "90
In contrast, Rabbi Soloveitchik describes the person for whom "the
world of prayer and the world of reality have nothing to do with each
other."91  Such an individual "enters [the] sanctuary humble and
contrite, in a mood of submission and humility... divest[ing] himself
of his arrogance, of his rigid, unbending character."" In the moment
of prayer, this person is not the "possessor of riches and chattels,
estates and factories, who drives his impoverished workers ruthlessly,
and whose hands are often stained with the blood of the outcast and
the ill-gotten gain wrung from the hands of the unfortunate. '" 93
"However," Rabbi Soloveitchik concludes, "no sooner does [this
individual] step outside into the noisy, clamorous street than he
reverts back to his original persona, to his previous haughty and
conceited self-centeredness."94
Though it may be argued that his Jewish heritage informed his work
and values, 95 there is little evidence in his book suggesting that Cohen
87. Id. at 93.
88. Cf. Wiesel, supra note 11, at 188 (observing that Rabbi Nachman's tales
"speak not of saints or... Rebbes but of princes and shepherds, of anonymous
beggars and horsemen, of sages and messengers-and not ... Jewish ones at that").
89. See supra Part 1.
90. Soloveitchik, supra note 86, at 94-95; see also Samuel J. Levine, The Broad
Life of the Jewish Lawyer: Integrating Spirituality, Scholarship and Profession, 27 Tex.
Tech L. Rev. 1199, 1205 (1996) (citing Moses C. Luzzatto, Mesillat Yesharim 336-39
(Shraga Silverstein trans., 1966); Maimonides, Mishne Torah, Laws of De'oth 3:2-3)
(concluding that "according to Maimonides, through my professional career I could
actually serve G-d, while Ramchal taught that I could utilize my career as a means
towards piety"); Samuel J. Levine, Further Reflections on the Role of Religion in
Lawyering and in Life, 11 Regent U. L. Rev. 31 (1998).
91. Soloveitchik, supra note 86, at 93.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 92-93.
94. Id. at 93; cf Randy Lee, Faith Through Lawyering: Finding and Doing What is
Mine to Do, 11 Regent U. L. Rev. 71, 87-88 (1998) ("[L]awyers need a way to link
what they do on the job with their deepest values and commitments. They need to
reconnect what they do on Monday with what they profess and pray on Sunday...
land] begin to break down the walls that have separated work from faith .... ").
95. This suggestion seems implicit in Professor Andrew Kaufman's observation
contrasting the work of Benjamin Cardozo with that of a number of other Jewish
lawyers, including Cohen. See Andrew L. Kaufman, Cardozo 99 (1998) ("Nor did
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looked to Jewish thought-or to religion more generally-in support
of his ethical ideals.96 Indeed, Cohen appears ambivalent at best, and
[Cardozo's] career resemble those of Jewish lawyers like Morris Hiliquit or Julius
Henry Cohen, who were deeply involved with new immigrant groups, unionism, the
use of arbitration in industrial disputes, and public service as counsel to various
administrative agencies.").
96. In contrast to Cohen, at least two of his illustrious predecessors in the field of
legal ethics, David Hoffman and George Sharswood, incorporated religion into their
lives and, at least to some degree, into their writings. See Susan D. Carle, Lawyers'
Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of the 1908 Canons, 24 Law and Soc.
Inquiry 1, 10 (1999). As Professor Carle noted,
David Hoffman and George Sharswood, the authors of the two most
important early-nineteenth-century American treatises on legal ethics,
approached the field of legal ethics from a tradition this article will refer to
as "religious jurisprudence." Their view, based on religious conviction and a
belief that a divine intelligence gave human beings moral faculties that
would not lead them astray, posited that lawyers could and should exert
their sense of justice in individual cases to steer the legal system toward just
results.
Id. Significantly, though both of these scholars extolled the work of lawyers, viewing
lawyers, using Professor Pearce's term, as America's "governing class," see generally
Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The Formation and
Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. Chi. L.
Sch. Roundtable 381 (2001), they both insisted that the work of lawyers is not
inherently virtuous absent the incorporation of ethical values and conduct.
Hoffman, whom Professor Shaffer considers the "father of... legal ethics,"
Shaffer, supra note 82, at 47, "was not only a careful student of religion ... but also a
law teacher who claimed that the Bible was essential to his craft." Id. at 49. Indeed,
as Shaffer notes, "Hoffman began his consideration of the law-not ethics, but law-
with the Bible... [and] recommended it as a primary source for learning law, for
learning professional skill, for being introduced to professional culture, and for
personal advancement in the profession." Id. at 50.
Hoffman posited that "great[ness] in law [required] great[ness] in every
virtue." Pearce, supra, at 389 (quoting David Hoffman, Course of Legal Study 26 (J.
Neal 2d ed., 1836)) (alterations in original). Thus, Hoffman "asserted that the
virtuous lawyer should reject any distinction between personal and professional
morality." Id. (citing Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hoffman and the Shaping of a
Republican Legal Culture, 38 Md. L. Rev. 673, 684 (1979)). In short, Hoffman wrote,
"[wjhat is morally wrong, cannot be professionally right." Id. (quoting Hoffman,
supra, at 765).
Sharswood, whose work, according to Pearce, "overshadowed" Hoffman's and
whose book, after its publication in 1854, "would dominate the field of legal ethics for
the next hundred years," id. at 389-90, was, according to Shaffer, apparently a devout
Christian, Shaffer & Shaffer, supra note 4, at 196. Like Hoffman, Sharswood begins
his discussion, not of ethics but of law, through reference to the Bible. See George
Sharswood, An Essay on Professional Ethics 10-14 (5th ed. Fred B. Rothman & Co.
1993) (1884).
Again like Hoffman, Sharswood insisted that "no man can ever be a truly
great lawyer, who is not in every sense of the word, a good man." Id. at 168, quoted in
Pearce, supra, at 390. In fact, Sharswood appears to have endorsed the lesson of the
stories of the two sons by Rabbi Nachman and Julius Cohen, see infra Parts I and II,
writing that "an invisible hand of reputation ensured that the most virtuous lawyers
would be the most financially successful." Pearce, supra, at 390 (citing Sharswood,
supra, at 75).
It should be noted, though, that in spite of both Hoffman's and Sharswood's
apparent personal devotion toward and professional reliance on religion, Shaffer
concludes that "there is little indication that the principal influences in the
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at times openly hostile toward the role of religion in public ethics,
quoting the conclusion that, in mid-nineteenth-century America,
"formal religion did not... lead in the world of ideals, nor even in the
true moral purpose of a people eagerly seeking spiritual growth."97
Moreover, he cites the position that "[a]s late as 1876... '[t]he nation
was apparently without ideals, save those of industrial progress[, and
r]eligion shared in this apathy, spending its energy in seizing what it
could of the tide of national prosperity.., and... retreating to the
stronghold of religious dogma."'' s
Instead, Cohen turned for guidance to Dr. Adler's "Society for
Ethical Culture,"9 9 which offered exhortations that, in both tone and
substance, echo religious teachings, but which, at the same time,
avoided direct reliance on religion. Thus, these ethical imperatives
take a secular humanistic form: "We are here-no matter who put us
here, or how we came here-to fulfill a task. We cannot afford to go
of our own volition until the last item of our duty is discharged."'"
Though the dedication to ethical conduct may evoke religious fervor,
"[t]he moral view of the professions leads their representatives to
subordinate the claims of ambition and of material gain" not to the
will of God, but "to the enduring interests of science, of justice, and to
all the permanent social interests that are confided to their
keeping."' °1
Nevertheless, despite his general aversion to religion as a source of
legal ethics, Cohen does rely on an episode involving religious life to
emphasize the importance of living a uniform and consistently ethical
life. Illustrating what some Europeans saw as "an irreconcilable
contradiction between the keen business instincts of the [American],
and his professions of religion,"1'02 Cohen offers a brief tale that
closely resembles Rabbi Soloveitchik's teaching of the same
principle." 3 In this tale, which is referred to as "one of the oldest
British gibes at America,"'0 4 a shopkeeper is seen "instructing his
clerk, preparing for the business of the morrow, to 'sand the sugar,
flour the ginger, lard the butter, and then come in to prayers." ' 105
development of legal ethics in America were thoughtfully or even consciously rooted
in the moral teachings of Moses, or of Jesus, or of the eighteenth-century English
clergy." Shaffer & Shaffer, supra note 4, at 196.
97. Cohen, supra note 8, at 157 (quoting Ephraim D. Adams, "The Power of
Ideals in American History," Dodge Lectures on the Responsibility of Citizenship
(Yale University Press)).
98. Id. (quoting Adams, supra note 97).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 65-69.
100. Cohen, supra note 8, at 158 (quoting Felix Adler, Life and Destiny 3).
101. Id. (quoting Adler, supra note 100, at 52).
102. Id. at 33 (quoting Adams, supra note 97) (emphasis omitted).
103. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
104. Cohen, supra note 8, at 33 (quoting Adams, supra note 97).
105. Id. at 33-34 (quoting Adams, supra note 97).
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This concise yet powerfully cautionary tale captures some of the key
elements of the lessons more fully explored in Cohen's and Rabbi
Nachman's stories of two sons. As in Rabbi Nachman's tale, the main
character is not a lawyer, but an individual engaged in business whose
"sophistication" expresses itself in a refusal to apply to professional
life the "simple" virtues that are permitted to find expression, if at all,
only in his personal life. As in Cohen's story of two lawyers, this
individual places professional ambition and financial success above
personal values, thus failing to uphold the ethical ideals that Cohen
propounds.
CONCLUSION
Cohen's brief story of the shopkeeper serves as a fitting
complement to his story of two lawyers. Together, the stories tell of
both lawyers and those involved in business, of individuals whose
personal values may be based in religion or in other sources of ethics.
Ultimately, the stories illustrate Cohen's vision for a legal
professionalism that looks beyond platitudes and presumptions of
virtue based in status, a professionalism rooted instead in an honest
and searching assessment of ethical conduct in the practice of law,
informed by a broader appreciation for the role of ethics in other
occupations and other areas of life. It is a vision, articulated nearly
one hundred years ago, that today remains as valuable as ever.
[Vol. 711356
